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BILINSKI V. KEITH HARING FOUNDATION,
INC., NO. 14CV1085 DLC, 2015 WL 996423
(S.D.N.Y. MAR. 6, 2015)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bilinski v. Keith Haring Foundation, Inc., Elizabeth Bilinski
(hereinafter "Bilinski") filed suit against the Keith Hating
Foundation, its individual officers and directors, including Julia
Gruen and Studio LLC, which operated the authentication
committee for the Foundation, as well as the Estate of Keith
Haring. Bilinski sued for interference with the exhibition and sale
of her Haring artwork, in violation of federal and state antitrust
claims under the Sherman Act and the Donnelly Act, respectively,
as well as false advertising under the Lanham Act.' Bilinski also
sought relief under New York law for defamation, conspiracy to
defame, tortious interference with prospective business relations,
trade libel, intentional infliction of economic harm/prima facie
tort, and unjust enrichment.' Bilinski owned a number of Keith
Hating artworks which she believed were authentic) Bilinski
submitted the artworks to the Foundation for a certification of
authenticity, which they denied to provide.' Bilinski sought to sell
the paintings and display them in an exhibition in Miami, both of
which were prevented by injunctions from the Foundation.' The
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed all the
claims in their entirety for failure to state a claim.6
II. BACKGROUND
The Keith Hating Foundation sold various Haring works for a
total of $4,598,697 between 2008 and 2011. 7 Three paintings by
1 Bilinski v. Keith Haring Foundation, Inc., No. 14CV1085 DLC, 2015 WL
996423, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2015).
2 Bilinski, 2015 WL 996423 at *1.
3 Id. at *2.
4id.
' Id. at *2-3.
6 Id. at *13.
7 id.
1
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Keith Haring were sold through Sotheby's in 2014.' Because many
auction houses require a certificate of authentication prior to
selling a work of art, when the Foundation's Authentication
Committee dissolved in 2012 the value of previously authenticated
works increased.' The lack of an authentication certificate
significantly reduces the price that can be acquired for art.
All of Bilinski's 111 Haring works of art were acquired through
Angelo Moreno and Delta Cortez, personal friends of Keith
Haring.' ° Both Moreno and Cortez provided Bilinski with letters of
provenance indicating the ownership history of the Haring works."
III. THE CASE
In 2007, Bilinski submitted transparencies of her collection to
the Keith Haring Foundation, along with letters of provenance
from the previous owner Angelo Moreno, but the Foundation
rejected the works as "not authentic.1 2 In 2008, the Foundation
accused Bilinski of selling or making "available for sale items you
are representing to be original works by Keith Haring when you
have been duly warned they are not," and threatened legal action if
Bilinski did not desist. 3 The Foundation failed to respond when
Bilinski made attempts to reconcile. 4 In 2010, Bilinski tried to sell
the collection through Sotheby's, and although a Sotheby's
representative believed that the works were authentic, they refused
to help her because of Julia Guen's interference. 5 The same result
occurred with the Gagosian Gallery in New York. 6 Bilinski then
tried to resubmit the collection to the Foundation for
authentication, having acquired more evidence of their
authenticity, but the Foundation refused to reconsider their prior
8 id.
9 ld. at * 1 -'2.
10 Id. at *2.
~'Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 id.
16 Id.
2
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judgment.'7 In 2013, Bilinski's collection was featured in an
exhibition in Miami. 8 Partway through the run of the exhibition,
the Foundation filed suit against the exhibition organizers seeking
a temporary restraining order. 9 The "Miami Complaint" described
the works as "fakes, forgeries, counterfeits and/or
infringements."2 In a subsequent press release, the Foundation
characterized the lawsuit as an "effort to stop the display of fake
Haring works at the exhibition."21
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The District Court was asked to consider a motion to dismiss all
claims made by the Foundation's complaint. In so doing, the court
is guided by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which states that a court must "accept all allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all inferences in the non-moving
party's favor. 22 Additionally, according to the landmark case of
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.123 Rather, a complaint
"must do more than offer naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.
24
A. Antitrust Claims
The antitrust claims asserted in the Complaint consist of
violations of Sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act, and the
corresponding New York State antitrust statute, the Donnelly
Act.25 Since the Donnelly Act is generally "coextensive" with the
17 Id.
18 Id. at *3.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Bilinski, 2015 WL 996423 at *3. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
24 Id.
25 Id. at *4.
3
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Sherman Act, the court's Opinion analyzed the claims
collectively.26
1. Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal "every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations. 27 In order to state a claim under Section 1, a
plaintiff must allege: "(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy
between two legally distinct entities, (2) in restraint of trade, and
(3) affecting interstate commerce. 28 To survive a motion to
dismiss, the Complaint must allege "enough facts to support the
inference that a conspiracy actually existed.
'2 9
The District Court found that the Complaint failed to state a
claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.3" The court reasoned
that Bilinski failed to allege "sufficient facts that would support
the inference of interdependent, rather than independent, conduct
by the alleged conspirators."'" Under the theories and broad
characterizations provided in -the Complaint, "any refusal by an
auction house, dealer, or gallery to sell a Haring without
authentication by the Foundation could be a conspiratorial act.
32
The court found that this ambiguous legal conclusion did not give
the defendants fair notice of the claim against them.33
Moreover, the conduct of the auction houses and galleries could
have entirely legal motives since "the decision by any individual
entity not to sell artwork that may not be authentic is an act
consistent with lawful, independent action."34 The court reasoned
that while Bilinski claimed that an art dealer's refusal to sell
26 Id. at *4 n.6.
27 Id. at *4.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1.
28 Id. at *4.
29 Bilinski, 2015 WL 996423 at *4. (quoting Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore, Md. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 135-36 (2d. Cir. 2013).
30 Id. at *4.
31 Id.
32 id.
33 id.
14 Id. at *5.
4
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artwork it believes is authentic is against it's self-interest, Bilinski
did not state "in a non-conclusory fashion any facts indicating
what benefit the auction houses derive from participating in a
group boycott of works they believe to be authentic but that have
not been authenticated by the Foundation."35
The court was directed to look at "the competitive reality rather
than the legal organization to determine if a conspiracy may exist
within one legal entity."36 Thus, the fact that some of the
Foundation's directors owned some Haring works does not make
them co-conspirators, nor separate competitors to the market as a
result of their compensation for their work with the Foundation.37
2. Monopolization
To state a claim for monopolization under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, the Complaint must allege: "(1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market; and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident."38 The core element of a
monopolization claim is market power, which may be
demonstrated "either through direct evidence that the defendant
can control prices or exclude competition, or through defendant's
share of the relevant market."39 Bilinski defined the relevant
market as "the worldwide market for the sale of Haring works,"
and claimed that the Foundation "continue[d] to act as an informal
market regulator by threatening or initiating pre-textual lawsuits to
preclude authentic Haring works from being exhibited or sold,"
especially as the owner of virtually all intellectual property rights
relating to Keith Haring.4 ° However, the court found that the
Complaint did not provide any factual basis for this contention,
35 id.
36 Id. at *5 (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183,
195 (2010).
" Id. at *6.
38 Id. at *7 (quoting Pepsico, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir.
2002)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2.
31 Id. at *7.
40 id.
5
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since they do not allege that defendants have participated in the
market more recently than 2011, or their market share.' According
to the court, while the defendants have monopoly power via their
intellectual property rights, and actively work to protect those
rights, that fact alone does not establish unlawful monopoly
power.42
B. The Lanham Act
The court also found that the pleading was insufficient for false
advertising in the Miami Press Release and Miami Complaint
under § 1125 of the Lanham Act, which deals with the
misrepresentation of facts.43 The requirements of commercial
advertising or promotion under the Lanham Act are: "(1)
commercial speech, (2) made for the purpose of influencing
consumers to buy defendant's goods or services, and (3)... they
must be disseminated sufficiently to the relevant purchasing
public."44 Here, however, Bilinski did not allege all the elements
required for a violation of the Act, and failed to draw "a sufficient
connection between either the Press Release or Miami Complaint
and a proposed commercial transaction. 4 5
C. State Tort Law Claims
The District Court chose to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims regarding the Miami Complaint and Press
Release, which include defamation and conspiracy to defame,
tortious interference with business relationships, trade libel,
intentional infliction of economic harm/prima facie tort, and unjust
enrichment. 6 However, the court first applied the rule of absolute
privilege for "statements made during judicial proceedings and the
statutory privilege according to anyone who makes a 'fair report'
41 Id. at *7.
42 Id. at *8.
41 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
44 Id. (quoting Gmurzynska v. Hutton, 355 F.3d 206, 210 (2d. Cir. 2004)).
45 Id.
46 Id. at *9-13.
6
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of a lawsuit."47 The court found that the statements in the Miami
Complaint, which describe Bilinski's Haring works as fakes or
counterfeits, are privileged and may not be the basis for a tort
claim since they are "directly relevant to the central dispute."48 On
the other hand, the court reasoned that "a reasonable jury could
find that the Press Release stated that the parties had agreed that
the works were inauthentic," despite that being an incorrect
characterization of the actual agreement.49 As such, the Press
Release did not make a fair report of the lawsuit and was not
privileged. °
Defamation or libel require a plaintiff to show: "(1) a written
defamatory factual statement concerning the plaintiff; (2)
publication to a third party; (3) fault; (4) falsity of the defamatory
statement; and (5) special damages or per se actionability."'
However, New York law distinguishes between defamation of a
person and defamation of a product, so that a statement against one
doesn't automatically affect the other. 2 In this case, the statements
in the Press Release named only the organizers of the Miami
exhibition of displaying fake Haring's, not the owners of the
works. 3 This reference "by implication" related only to Bilinski's
"property," not herself, and thus is not the basis for defamation. 4
To prevail on a tortious interference with business relations
claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) it had a business
relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant knew of that
relationship and intentionally interfered with it; (3) the defendant
acted solely out of malice, or used dishonest, unfair, or improper
means; and (4) the defendant's interference caused injury to the
relationship.5  The court briefly but strictly applied these
requirements and dismissed the claim because it neither identified
a potential buyer, nor alleged "that the defendants knew of the
41 Id. at *9.
48 Id.
49 Id. at *10.
50 Id.
51 Id. (quoting Chau v. Lewis, 771 F.3d 118, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2014)).
52 Bilinski, 2015 WL 996423 at *10.
" Id. at *11.
54 Id.
55 Id.
7
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business relationship at the time they filed their lawsuit or issued
the Press Release. 56
In considering the claims for both trade libel and intentional
infliction of economic harm, the court focused on special damages.
Special damages are one of the requirements for recovery for
disparagement of goods, along with a "defamatory statement
directed at the quality of a business's goods."57 Special damages
have been defined as "the loss of something having economic or
pecuniary value."58 However, the court found that the plaintiffs
made a poor attempt at itemizing damages, by including only very
general information and by failing to name the anticipated sales
price or the potential buyer. 9
Finally, the court found that the claim for unjust enrichment
should also be dismissed. The necessary elements for the claim are
proof that: "(1) the defendant was enriched; (2) at plaintiff's
expense; and (3) equity and good conscience militate against
permitting defendant to retain what plaintiff is seeking to
recover." 6° Specifically, the benefit gained by the defendant must
be specific and directly related to the alleged loss, an aspect the
court found lacking.61 The court characterized Bilinski's argument
that the defendants' Haring works increased in value as a result of
their acts as both "indirect and hypothetical. 62 Indeed, the benefit
would not flow directly to the defendants and to the detriment of
Bilinski.63
56 Id. at *12.
57 Id. (quoting Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 312
F.3d 48, 59 (2d Cir. 2002)).
58 Bilinski, 2015 WL 996423 at *12 (quoting Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256,
271 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted)).
59 Bilinski, 2015 WL 996423 at * 12.
60 Id. at 13 (quoting Briarpatch Ltd., L.P v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d
296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004).)
61 Bilinski, 2015 WL 996423 at *13.
62 id.
63 id.
8
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V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
This case demonstrates that despite the fact that
many authentication committees throughout the art world no
longer operate or consider new works, they still hold considerable
sway over sales. Prior to this case, the Keith Haring Foundation
decided to stop accepting requests to review potential Haring
artworks, joining a growing club which includes the Andy Warhol
Foundation for the Visual Arts, the Roy Lichtenstein Foundation,
the Noguchi Museum, and the Basquiat estate, all of whom no
longer conduct authentication analyses.64 All of these foundations
and museums have stopped authenticating art in an effort to avoid
litigation.65 Litigation can be prohibitively expensive for these
organizations, and often times the benefits do not outweigh the
risks.66 In 2009, the Warhol Foundation spent $7 million defending
itself in a lawsuit concerning a silk-screen it had denied to include
in their catalogue raisonne.67 The case rested on a claim for
conspiring to restrain trade and monopolize the Warhol market.68
This type of antitrust claim has become the popular strategy for
collectors looking to take on these behemoth art authentication
committees, a trend which Bilinski continues.69 Even though the
plaintiffs rarely win, the time and legal expense is a serious
deterrent for authentication committees to keep operating, and has
64 Irina Tarsis, The Keith Haring Foundation Announces Its Decision to
Disband Authentication Committee, CENTRE FOR ART LAW, Jan. 25, 2012,
http://itsartlaw.com/2012/09/20/the-keith-haring-foundation-announces-its-
decision-to-disband-authentication-committee/.
65 Patricia Cohen, In Art, Freedom of Expression Doesn't Extend to 'Is It
Real?', THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/06/20/arts/design/art-scholars-fear-lawsuits-in-declaring-works-real-or-
fake.html?_r-0.
66 id.
67 Id; see also Simon- Whelan v. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts,
Inc., 2009 WL 1457177 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
68 Charles & Thomas Danziger, On the Case: Exploring Real World Art Law
Issues, ART NET NEWS, April 23, 2014, https://news.artnet.com/market/on-the-
case-exploring-real-world-art-law-issues- 11677.
69 Id.
9
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now contributed to a large number of their closures.7" Interestingly,
the Bilinski court declined to extend the reasoning in Simon-
Whelan v. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc.,
because they found the two cases to be too factually dissimilar.7 ' In
Simon-Whelan, the plaintiff "alleged a conspiracy between the
Warhol Foundation, which published a catalogue raisonne, and the
Board, which authenticated or declined to authenticate submitted
works."72 In Bilinski, the conspiracy was instead alleged to be
between the Foundation and art dealers, auction houses, and
galleries.73 Regardless, both the Warhol Foundation and the Keith
Haring Foundation stopped their authentication business after
these proceedings.74 Joel Wachs, the Andy Warhol Foundation's
director, noted that the cost to defend itself became too great,
especially when they would "rather be giving it [the money] to
artists."75
However, because of the lack of art knowledge generally held
by the courts, the judicial system holds authentication committees
in especially high regard. This is demonstrated by the standard of
review, where the plaintiffs can only be successful against an
"expert" (as these committees are) based on a high standard, or
greater than the preponderance of the evidence. A plaintiff suing
an authenticator like the Foundation here would need to specify
"the facts supporting each part of each claim and prove the claim
by clear and convincing evidence (a higher hurdle than
preponderance)."76 A New York State appellate court in a case
concerning the artist Alexander Calder commented that "courts
have neither the education to appropriately weigh the experts'
opinions nor the authority to independently gather all available
70 See Cohen, In Art, Freedom of Expression Doesn't Extend to 'Is It Real?',
THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.corn/2012/06/20/
arts/design!art-scholars-fear-lawsuits-in-declaring-works-real-or-
fake.html?_r-0.
71 Bilinski, 2015 WL 996423 at *6.
72 Id.
73 id.
74 Stacy Perman, This is Bad News for People Who Spend Millions on Art,
FORTUNE, Sept. 24, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/09/24/art-fakes-lawsuits/.
75 Id.
76 Danziger, supra note 68.
10
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appropriate information."77 The court continued to note that the
courts could not impact the injury to the plaintiffs of not being able
to sell a painting because the art market itself places its own value
on the opinions of authentication committees and foundations, not
the courts.78 That sentiment holds true for the Bilinski case as well,
since Bilinski would not be able to sell her paintings at the value
she sought regardless of whether the suit was successful or not
because that is a remedy that the law cannot offer. Indeed, as the
court points out, a refusal to sell by art galleries does not
necessarily point to illegal collusion, but "is consistent with both
independent and interdependent conduct... [and] an assessment of
a number of factors."
To be sure, the authenticator of a work of art and the
authentication boards serve their own market function.79 The Court
in Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Foundation, 890
N.Y.S.2d 16, 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) criticized this function by
reasoning that "Plaintiffs problem can be solved only when
buyers are willing to make their decisions based upon the Work
and the unassailable facts about its creation, rather than allowing
the Foundation's decisions as to what merits inclusions in its
catalogue raisonne to dictate what is worthy of purchase."8 ° For
now, however, the stakes in authentication remain incredibly high
because of the record-breaking prices for art and the security
authentication certificates provide the seller and auction house
from liability.8 This past year, Paul Gauguin's portrait, Nafea Faa
Ipoipo, sold for $300 million in a private sale while Picasso's Les
femmes d'Alger (Version "0') sold for $179 million at
Christie's.82
The question that remains is if an authenticator was sufficiently
protected from suit, would they go back into business? Should
77 Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88, 101 (N.Y.
2009)
78 id.
79 PATrY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW, 424 (3d
ed. 2012).
80 Thome, 70 A.D.3d at 103.
81 See Perman, This is Bad News for People Who Spend Millions on Art,
FORTUNE, Sept. 24, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/09/24/art-fakes-lawsuits/.
82 id.
2015]
11
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they? Should the market attempt to place value on a work of art for
art historical purposes, rather than purely for market purposes?
Unfortunately, independent experts and historians are being
pushed out of their business because they too fear potential legal
repercussions.83 In the place of authentication committees, there is
the potential for fakes and forgeries to rise up and fill the gap and
ambiguity in the market.84
VI. CONCLUSION
Elizabeth Bilinski filed suit against the Keith Haring Foundation
for violation of federal and state antitrust statutes stemming from
alleged interference with Bilinski's attempt to sell her Keith
Haring paintings. The District Court for the Southern District of
New York dismissed all claims brought by Elizabeth Bilinski
against the Keith Haring Foundation, finding that the claims were
without merit, especially since Bilinski failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. This suit is another in a long line of
suits against art authentication committees, most of which are
meritless, but which have contributed to a large number of
authentication committees refusing to continue their services due
to the expense that litigation brings.
Lauren Bursey*
83 id.
84 Only this past summer, fakes and forgery groups were busted in France and
Spain, respectively. Id.
* J.D. Candidate 2017, DePaul University College of Law.
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